【 Special Lecture 1 】

 

Up to the Agreement for June 15 South-North Inter-Korean Summit

 

Lawmaker Park Jie-won

 

  Former President Kim Dae-jung, a long-time opposition leader, had never slowed down in his movement for unification, although he had been falsely charged with being a communist sympathizer under dictatorship governments.   

 

  President Kim, who facilitated the first peaceful power transition since the foundation of Korea, proposed an idea of holding an inter-Korean summit in his inauguration speech on February 25, 1998. 

 

  Back then, I was the Presidential Press Secretary and obliged to stand by President Kim all the time in almost every presidential event. Early 2000, I happened to meet the late Hyundai Chairman Jung Mong-heun, and exchanged opinions on possibility of a South-North summit. 

 

  I reported the meeting to President Kim immediately. Mentioning the late Hyundai founder Jung's visit to the North with herds of cattle, he instructed me to continue to contact Chairman Jung Mong-heun since he believed Hyundai Group might be able to arrange it. Since then I had become a contact point and sought for advice and consultation from Director of National Intelligence Service Lim Dong-won, and we worked to make things happen. 

 

  Early February 2000, I met with Chairman Jung and Japanese businessman Yosida at Lotte Hotel and discussed the possibility of the inter-Korean summit.

 

  And I got NIS confirmation that positive progress was made toward the intended direction after the intelligence agency checked out communications done back and forth between Mr. Yosida and North Korean counterparts. 

 

   In the meantime, North Korea released a statement saying that the NIS should not be a channel in any circumstances and proposed a meeting in Singapore early March. 

 

  President Kim asked me to assume the position of the special envoy to North Korea, and I declined by saying, "I am not eligible for the position. Instead, the Minister of Unification would be the right man." But he insisted, "the news may be exposed if the Minister takes the job. And Pyongyang also wishes to have my closest aid as a counterpart so that you'd better go." I accepted that offer finally.

 

  On March 8, I was sitting on the negotiation table together with Mr. Kim Bo-hyun and Seo hun of the NIS and Deputy Commissioner of Asia-Pacific Committee Song Ho-kyung, who was the North Korean special envoy. I explained President Kim's philosophy, passion for unification, and his Berlin declaration. 

 

  After five-hour long conversation in two sessions, special envoy Song said, "it was like I have been talking with President Kim. Let's keep this meeting to ourselves and officialize the next meeting and on."

  At that short moment, I became highly confident that the inter-Korean summit would be realized. In retrospect, I assume that the meeting in Singapore was endorsed by Chairman Kim, but not discussed with the army. That's why they sought not to make the meeting officialized, I believe.

 

  Having gone through the first meeting in Shanghai, and the second and the third meetings in Beijing, special envoy Song from the North and I from the South signed on the agreement dated April 8 for the inter-Korean summit, which marked the beginning of a history for the first inter-Korean summit after a half-century-old people's division. 

 

  Upon the preparation embarked, I had to deal with various issues from meeting agenda, contents of a joint statement, and protocol. But the biggest obstacle came with North's request for economic support. I responded with decisive rejection. I kept emphasizing that a successful summit would lead to inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation, on which North Korea could build prosperous economy like China and Vietnam. Questions over this matter have been cleared up through investigations by special prosecutors, which found that Hyundai provided Pyongyang with USD 450 million in return for business permit in 7 areas including railroads and communications. The fact was also confirmed in the supreme court ruling.   

  

  Currently a possibility and necessity of sending a special envoy to the North is much discussed. I doubt that North Korea would accept any offer from the Lee government, but if President Lee Myung-bak announces that the government acknowledges the legitimacy of the June 15 South-North Joint Declaration and October 4 Joint Statement and proposes to dispatch a special envoy, North Korea may accept the offer.

 

  As I did in the past, a special envoy to North Korea should be the one who is closest to President Lee and able to deliver presidential intention as it is. If needed, I will make myself available to facilitate the process as the first trailblazer in such endeavor. 

 

  If there is another possibility to open an era of inter-Korean cooperation anew, I will do the same, taking all the troubles happily to make things happen. And if I am asked to pick the most honorous memory in my life, I will certainly say that it was serving as the special envoy to North Korea at the request of President Kim Dae-jung. Thank you.