【 Special Lecture 3 】
The Obama Administration's Policy on North Korea and the June 15 South-North Joint Declaration
Moon Chung-in,
Professor of Political Science and International Relations,
Yonsei University
I still cherish to this day the emotional moment of enthusiasm shared by those at the historic summit which took place in Pyongyang on June 15, 2000, the palpable sense that lasting peace on the Korean peninsula lay just around the corner. As I witnessed with my very own eyes a new foundation of mutual trust being built through the expansion of cooperation and exchange between the two countries, the dismantling of the Cold War structure that had haunted the peninsula for decades never seemed more achievable.
However, as we reach the ninth anniversary of that hopeful event, the Korean peninsula is poised amidst a dramatically different vision, one in which the hard earned progress of recent history has unraveled and left us worse off than where we began.. The foundation for mutual trust, exchange and cooperation achieved through the concerted effort of the 'People’s Government' and the 'Participatory Government' over the last decade is all but shattered. US-North Korean relations hover at a precarious precipice, while the Six-Party talks, which were revived only after a long and difficult series of trial and error, have indefinitely stalled. And with the third North Korea's nuclear crisis imminent, the prospect of peace and security on the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia has been critically undermined.
As has ever been the case, the United States policy position on North Korea remains a crucial variable in resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis and establishing peace on the Korean peninsula. For this very reason, I held high expectations upon the inauguration of the Obama administration, as President Barack Obama resolutely declared his desire to restore the fallen international standing of the US. He promised a willingness to solve pressing issues through dialogue, even with so called enemies, and made it clear that he would help pursue a new world order through international cooperation rather than hegemonic unilateralism. He harshly criticized the Bush Administration's policy towards North Korea and suggested he would adopt a more prudent approach similar to that of the Clinton administration to address vital challenges such as the nuclear problem, even were it to involve meeting with Kim Jong-il anytime and anywhere.
Thus as the Obama administration took office, I expected a revival of the 'Bill Clinton-Kim Dae-jung' model that had culminated in a positive but premature end in November 2000. The June 2000 Korean summit had served as a turning point for US-North Korean relations and shortly thereafter in October 2000, Vice Marshal Cho Myong-rok, North Korea's second most powerful man, paid an official visit to then President Clinton. Vice Marshal Cho and then US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright adopted a joint statement in which both nations agreed to refrain from hostile intentions and policies, to respect each other's sovereignty, and to offer assurance of non-use of force and the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs.
To reciprocate Cho's visit to the US, Secretary Albright visited Pyongyang on October 23 and met with Chairman Kim Jong-il to arrange President Clinton's visit to North Korea scheduled for November, raising hopes that relations between the two countries would reach a critical inertia of goodwill. Had Clinton’s visit to North Korea materialized and Al Gore won the presidency and continued Clinton’s North Korea policy, I firmly believe that diplomatic normalization of the two countries would have led to the relatively easy resolution of the North Korean nuclear and missile issues and the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean peninsula, heralding a new epoch of peace in the region.
Unfortunately, Clinton's visit to North Korea was ultimately aborted due to pressure from the Republican Party and Gore’s loss in the 2000 presidential election bringing the momentum to an abrupt halt. Compounding this shift was the George W. Bush administration's stance on North Korea, effectively premised on a principle of 'Anything but Clinton (ABC)', which left the North Korean issue reeling in uncertainty.
Given the past success of the Clinton years and a comparable diplomatic posture indicated by President Obama, I anticipated that the new administration would have adopted a more progressive policy towards North Korea based on the Clinton-Kim Dae-jung model. In fact, President Obama could have avoided the current confrontation if he had sent a high ranking envoy to North Korea immediately following his inauguration with the message that the US was willing to normalize its relations with the North and to remove the posture of mutual hostility that had characterized the last eight years. By presenting a concrete road map for the verifiable dismantling of nuclear facilities, programs, and weapons in light of such a gesture, the concurrent pursuit of Six Party talks and US-North Korean bilateral talks could have facilitated a breakthrough to the North Korean nuclear quagmire.
However, the Obama administration has been preoccupied domestically with the economic crisis and internationally with the Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, and Palestine issues, leaving North Korea a low policy priority. Moreover, the administration’s review of the existing North Korea policy continues to be delayed, while nominations for key positions responsible for US policies on North Korea have made little progress to date. Although US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton officially announced the appointment of Ambassador Stephen W. Bosworth as special representative for North Korean policy during her visit to Seoul on February 20, the announcement has had little substantive impact. Rather, it was other remarks made during her visit that proved more significant, as she perhaps unintentionally provoked the ire of North Korean leadership.
Aside from her views on North Korea's highly enriched uranium program, the stance presented by Secretary Clinton was largely indistinguishable from that of the Bush administration. The similarity was apparent both in tone and substance from her remarks, using such phrases as "the complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula," and "becoming a global strategic alliance that rests upon shared commitments and common values – democracy, human rights, market economies, and the pursuit of peace," the explicit emphasis on the "tyranny and poverty” in North Korea and warning that "North Korea's relations with the US will not improve until it engages in dialogue with South Korea.” Clinton also made it clear that North Korea "cannot improve its relationship with the United States while insulting South Korean leadership and refusing dialogue with the South.” Although it is natural for the US to stand with South Korea as its ally, Secretary Clinton should have shown more prudence and deliberation in her language regarding North Korea as the remarks appeared needlessly provocative and could be misconstrued as reflecting a concrete US policy toward the North that at the time was not yet finalized.
The inactivity of the Obama administration in addressing the North Korean issue proved especially unfortunate in that North Korea had high expectations of the Obama administration and hoped to positively engage the new administration sooner rather than later. However, it grew impatient as the US diverted its policy attention elsewhere. In fact, North Korea's rocket launch on April 5 can be seen as an attempt to strengthen not only its domestic positioning vis-à-vis a display of ‘a strong, prosperous, and great nation (Gangsungdaeguk)” but also its bargaining position as the US invariably refocused its attention toward the North. But the real motive behind the launching may also have been to test the Obama administration’s true intentions toward, and perception of, North Korea.
A series of North Korean behavior before and after the rocket launching clearly corroborate this argument. For instance, it was altogether remarkable the lengths to which North Korean went to fully comply with international regulations and procedures when it launched the rocket this past April. When it launched the Taepodong 1 on August 31, 1998, North Korea let the world know four days after the test launch, while it made a similar announcement one day after the launch of Taepodong 2 in July 2006 This time, however, North Korea notified the International Maritime Organization of the expected launch time and flying trajectory almost one month before the launch. Moreover, it explicitly declared that the projectile was a research satellite for science and telecommunications purposes and voluntarily signed six international treaties and agreements related to the peaceful use of outer space. Additionally, after close consideration, North Korea seems to have deliberately identified and exploited an unfortunate but nevertheless legitimate loophole in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 insofar as it knew there were no concrete regulations concerning satellite activity as opposed to ballistic missiles and related technology. The final point is especially worth noting because by using the launch as proof of its normal behavior by complying with international rules and procedures, North Korea structured a calculated test to determine how willing the new administration was to recognize the North in the context of a normal international state.
International reaction, and the reaction of the US in particular, to the rocket launch was negative. The US regarded the rocket as a missile and accused the North of violating the UN Security Council Resolution 1718. North Korea's claim that it launched a satellite as part of its commitment to the peaceful use of space was flatly rejected and the act was interpreted as a provocation which threatened the US and neighboring allies.
Washington decided to apply to North Korea the 'crime and punishment' principle advocated by the Bush administration. It argued that North Korea's rocket launch was a clear violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1718, which required firm punishment from the international community. In pursuing these punitive efforts, Washington cooperated closely with South Korea and Japan, not to mention the UN, and aggressively solicited the participation of China and Russia. The Obama administration also announced that it would not make any concessions in order to bring North Korea back to the Six-Party talks, as had been done in the past, effectively conveying to the North that the US would no longer concede to habitual North Korean threats and blackmail.
Although the US response to the rocket launch was unusually unforgiving, it too had cause for the resolute stance. President Obama himself appealed to the North to refrain from the launch and sent Stephen Bosworth, Special Representative for North Korean Policy, to Beijing in order to explore the possibility of his visit to North Korea. But Pyongyang defied these goodwill gestures, making Washington increasingly impatient. The North further angered the Obama administration by undertaking the rocket launch fully aware that the Obama administration had not yet been able to appoint its key officials on North Korean policy and policy review on North Korea was not completed. North Korea’s failure to accommodate such circumstances by delaying any provocative actions proved a critical miscalculation. At the same time, diplomatic pressure from Japan and South Korea played a significant role in shifting US policy toward a hard line stance, as the South Korean government, in close cooperation with the Japanese government, demanded immediate punitive actions against North Korea. This was a dramatic contrast to the past when South Korea served as a counterweight to hard line US policy. As the US could not turn a deaf ear to the demands of two major allies in the region, the options available to the Obama administration in addressing the issue were considerably limited.
Despite its inconsistent actions, North Korea’s hope for new progress must have been severely disappointed. Following the adoption of the UN Security Council's presidential statement, sanctions against three North Korean companies and other follow-up measures, North Korea responded with an equally tough stance. It declared its withdrawal from the Six-Party talks, expelled inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency, and formally announced the recommencement of reprocessing of spent fuel rods. Then, on April 29, North Korea announced that it would conduct a second nuclear test, test launch an intercontinental ballistic missile and build a light-water reactor by securing lowly-enriched uranium unless the UN Security Council issued an apology. As announced, North Korea carried out a second nuclear test on May 25 and now appears determined to act on its own accord, following its own timetable.
As for the US, Washington is now taking the issue very seriously. In a press conference in Paris on June 6, President Obama suggested that there were limits to the US’ diplomatic patience as he defined North Korea's moves as "extraordinarily provocative." Increasingly, the sentiments of such comments can be seen being concretized into a series of policies. The US and Japan are pushing hard at the UN Security Council for a resolution to impose the toughest sanctions yet seen against North Korea Which includes severe economic sanctions and strict inspections of North Korean vessels in both territorial and international waters. The US also revealed that it would consider acting independently to impose further financial sanctions akin to those taken in the Banco Delta Asia incident.
Although the US has left open a window for dialogue, it seems to have hardened its stance to induce North Korean policy change through tougher policies centered around isolation and containment. If North Korea gives in to US pressure and returns to the framework of either Six-Party or bilateral talks, it may yet have the opportunity to recover from its current misfortunes, but if not, the Korean peninsula would be poised for catastrophe. Should North Korea continue to reject international pressure and take provocative actions, the US could entertain a resolution to the nuclear issue through regime change in the North. The US has even given the impression that it would be willing to take military action through close US-South Korea cooperation should any military conflicts arise over the course of events.
The grave concern is that any military escalation might not end in a conventional military conflict. The South Korean government is wishing to include words 'extended deterrence' in a joint statement of the US-South Korea summit meeting scheduled on June 16 in order to secure the reaffirmation of a US nuclear umbrella over South Korea. This move would recognize the North as a nuclear state fait accompli and irrevocably trigger a nuclear arms race on the Korean peninsula. The opening of such a Pandora ’s Box would spell a security disaster to which the region and world may have little recourse.
More importantly, I am not sure how effective the proposed sanctions would be on North Korea. The North would not cave to these pressures and return to the negotiating table with hat in hand. It is very unlikely that North Korea, having declared itself in possession of nuclear weapons, would do so. In fact, historically no country that has actually possessed nuclear weapons, as opposed to merely the capability to produce them, has ever surrendered to external pressure and made such compromises. Thus, a strategy of hostile neglect based on isolation and containment is prone to failure no matter how much patience is adopted regarding North Korea, because time simply allows the North to continue to build up its capacities for weapons of mass destruction and escalate the tension on the Korean peninsula.
Military action should never be seen as a realistic alternative either, especially as it alone will never lead to the achievement of either military or political goals. Moreover, the utter tragedy and devastation of the Korean War is an experience no one in South Korea can bear to countenance. And due to the geopolitical terrain of the Korean peninsula, even a minor military campaign could rapidly escalate into a large-scale military conflict. For this reason, negotiation is and remains the only viable solution, and it will always be difficult to support an excessively hard line posture against North Korea that puts at imminent risk the lives and prosperity of an entire South Korean people.
Against such a backdrop, I wish to offer a number of policy proposals to the Obama administration.
-The Obama administration should reflect deeply on the lessons learned from the 'five lost years' of the Bush administration and reexamine the merits of the 'Clinton-Kim Dae-jung' model. In particularly, it should look to the successes of the first and second inter-Korean summit meetings and consider seeking a breakthrough based on such summit diplomacy.
-Prerequisite to any resolution concerning the North Korean issue is the need for a symbolic and substantive paradigm shift. President Obama's speech delivered at Cairo University on June 4 touched the entire Islamic world and laid the groundwork for severing what has been a cycle of 'suspicion and discord' between the US and Islamic countries. The US needs to make a similar political gesture of comparable scale and scope to North Korea as well, through which it can restore a sense of hope and possibility. At the same time, the US needs to send explicit signals that it will change its North Korean policy to back up such rhetoric. The slow and steady bureaucratic “tit-for-tat” approach of the past is insufficient to the task of inspiring the dramatic turn-around needed. Only a bold and comprehensive approach will be able to resolve the current crisis.
-For this to happen, the Obama administration needs to apply greater empathy in evaluating the situation from the perspective of North Korea. It needs to acknowledge North Korea's position and identity, from which it can accordingly create and coordinate a more appropriate and targeted stance against North Korea. Washington needs to listen not only to functional experts who specialize in the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction but also those with area specialists in North Korean affairs. I would also suggest that it should be more exacting when distinguishing between the assessments of such genuine specialists and those of the amateur generalists so prevalent in Washington.
-Additionally, the current Six-Party Talk structure lacks an adequate system of checks and balances. China and Russia have grown increasingly diminished in the face of the concerted hard line position adopted not only by the US, South Korea and Japan, but also by North Korea. Without the prospect of a possible middle ground, the Six-Party Talks have quickly lost its bearing and is at risk of losing legitimacy. The US needs to immediately find a way to reestablish the equilibrium, while China should make a more active diplomatic effort as the host of the Six-Party Talks. Also, South Korea needs to realize that a tough stance against North Korea is not the only solution.
-Lastly, I would like to reemphasize that the people of South Korea would not approve of a strategy of hostile neglect based on isolation and containment nor any consequent military action. If tension builds on the Korean peninsula as North Korea is relentlessly pushed into a corner, we may see anti-American sentiment witnessed between 2002 and 2003 once again spread like wildfire It is still not too late. The Obama administration should take action to resolve the issue based on negotiation, or the Korean peninsula may well become the first failure of the Obama administration's diplomatic experience.
